

# Panel discussion

Topic:

Challenges & Smart Solutions:  
Protocol ,Interoperability, Testing and collaboration

People:

- 1.Mr. Vipin Tyagi -CDOT Moderator
- 2.Dr. Abhijit Lele BOSCH
- 3.Mr.Ian Deakin iconnective
- 4.Mr. Sharad Arora Sensorise
- 5Mr. Omar Elloumi Nokia
- 6Mr. Colin Blanchard BT


Time

2 minutes introduction +48 minutes/6= 8 minutes per person

Audience:


Stay awake ,Clap for Speakers, Note down questions

# Actors in the M2M Ecosystem




# Interoperability - Sharing , Caring, Growing



data being shared between multiple business processes




**And there are billions of these devices...!!**




# oneM2M Nodes & Functionality



# oneM2M Nodes Hierarchy



# oneM2M Protocols in different layers



# oneM2M Security Architecture

## Security Services

### Security Function Layer

Identification &  
Authentication

Authorization

Identity  
Management

Security  
Association

Sensitive Data  
Handling

Security  
Administration

### Security Environments Layer


Secure Environment n

Sensitive Data

Sensitive Functions

# M2M Secure Communication

- Hop-by-Hop
- TLS/DTLS
  - ✓ DTLS if UDP Transport
  - ✓ TLS if TCP transport





# oneM2M Security Measures

## Hardware Level Security




- Tamper resistant Storage of long-term Service-Layer Keys within M2M Devices/Gateways
- Non-access to Service-Layer Keys stored within HSM/server-HSM
- Secure Storage of long-term Service-Layer Keys within M2M Infrastructure Equipment
- Secure Execution of sensitive Functions in M2M Devices/M2M Gateways
- Physical/logical Binding of HSM to M2M Device/Gateway

## Software Level Security




- Use of Security Associations, mutual Authentication and Confidentiality
- Proven Resistance to Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
- Limited Life Session Keys bound to Service Layer
- Replay Protection along with Policy based Action
- Integrity Verification along with shared Asset Inventory mechanism
- Secure Communication Link with Security Control
- Prevent Injection of Un-trusted Data through parameterized API mechanism



**THANK YOU**

# Real Life Example (e.g. Temperature Monitoring.)



Starting assumptions:

- Bootstrapping / DM is done (provisioning of credentials/apps)
- MN-CSE and IN-CSE have logically connected (authentication, binding, encryption)
- Apps have authenticated to xCSE and access right were established